Abstract-Multilevel games are abstractions of situations where decision makers are distributed in a network environment. In Part I of this paper, the authors present several of the challenging problems that arise in the analysis of multilevel games. In this paper a specific set up is considered where the two games being played are zero-sum games and where the decision makers use the linear reward-inaction algorithm of stochastic learning automata. It is shown that the effective game matrix is decided by the willingness and the ability to cooperate and is a convex combination of two zero-sum game matrices. Analysis of the properties of this effective game matrix and the convergence of the decision process shows that players tend toward noncooperation in these specific environments. Simulation results illustrate this noncooperative behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A NALYSIS of the collective behavior of agents distributed in a network has received considerable attention in the literature (refer to [1] , [2] , and the references therein). In [1] and [2] , distributed decision makers are modeled as players in a two-level game. High-level decisions concern the game environment and determine the willingness of the players to form a coalition. Low-level decisions determine the actions to be taken within the chosen environment. Specifically, we assume there are two agents, Agents 1 and 2, with Agent 1 consisting of Players 1 and 3, and Agent 2 consisting of Players 2 and 4. There are two games, A and B, to be played. In this two-level game model Players 3 and 4 make a choice between the two games, and Players 1 and 2 actually play the game. It is assumed that players in the same agent receive the same reward and penalty. In this set up, the decision mechanisms are modeled by learning automata [3] , [4] .
There are several choices for the games A and B (zero-sum games or nonzero-sum games) and there are several choices for the learning algorithms used by the decision makers. In [1] and [2] , the decision makers exclusively use the classical linear reward-penalty algorithm ( -). The model considered in these papers is a natural extension of the one-level games analyzed in [5] . In [1] , it was first observed that when the decision makers share the information relating to their mixed strategies with a delay and when the reward parameter is decreased, unstable oscillations ensue. Using the Feigenbaum plot in [2] it is now shown that the behavior of the system approaches chaotic behavior and the transition follows the classical pattern through a sequence of bifurcations.
This paper complements the analysis in [2] . It is assumed that games A and B are both zero-sum games and that the referee knows the actual actions chosen by the players instantaneously without any delay. In addition, it is assumed that the decision makers use the linear-inaction ( -) algorithm instead of the -algorithm as in [1] and [2] . To simplify the analysis it is assumed that all four players use the same reward parameter .
In Section II, the basic game matrices are described. The details of the -learning algorithm as used by players are contained in Section III. Salient properties of the convex combinations of two zero-sum matrices are given in Section IV. Section V shows the main result relating to the convergence when the two game matrices have coincident saddle points in pure strategies, with extension to the noncoincident case in Section VI. A sampling of the simulation results are given in Section VII and concluding observations are given in Section VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME MATRIX
In general, games A and B can be represented by bi-matrices and where is the probability for Agent 's players to receive a reward of 1 unit if game A is chosen and strategy pair is played. Similar interpretation holds for . In this paper we only consider zero-sum games. That is, and . Thus, game A will be represented simply by in which is the probability for Players 1 and 3 to receive 1 unit reward if game A is chosen and strategy pair is played. Game B will be represented by with the same interpretation. Let and denote the probabilities for Player 3 to choose games A and B on the th play of the game, respectively. Likewise, and denote the probabilities for Player 4 to choose games A and B on the 1083-4419/99$10.00 © 1999 IEEE th play, respectively. Game A will be played only when both players choose game A. Hence the probability for game A to be chosen is . With the above assumptions, the average game payoff matrix on the th play for Players 1 and 3 is
We also define , where . is the average game matrix on the th play for Players 2 and 4.
III. THE LEARNING ALGORITHM
The basic results on learning algorithms applied to zerosum, two-player games are discussed in [5] and [6] . In a learning algorithm, each player increases the probability of choosing a particular pure strategy, if that strategy was chosen on the previous play and led to a gain for that player. The probabilities for the other strategies are adjusted so that the total probability remains 1. Denote by and the number of strategies available to Players 1 and 2, and , , , 
IV. PROPERTIES OF MATRIX
The payoff matrix and the learning algorithm together determine the dynamics of , , , . The game matrix is a convex combination of matrices and , where the combination coefficients depend on . As shown in [6] , the existence of a saddle point in the game matrix is crucial in determining the dynamics of each player's strategy. In the following, we discuss the existence of saddle points for in relation to the saddle points of matrices and . Proof: From the definition of our learning algorithm in Section III it is seen that constitute the set of all absorbing states for the Markov process . That is, with probability one iff . The same also holds true for , , and . Since in a distance diminishing model with absorbing set , with probability one [7] , we have for the process under consideration with probability one.
Notice that Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 are independent of the structure relating to the presence of the saddle point in pure strategies and its location of the game matrices and . Let denote the state to which converges. Define Prob In particular, let for notational convenience. Let be the space of all real-valued continuously differentiable functions with bounded derivative defined on . Let . The learning algorithm defines an operator where represents the mathematical expectation. It can be shown [5] that the operator is linear, and preserves positive functions.
Assuming (1, 1) is a saddle point of game matrix and , then is characterized by the following result, which we state as a lemma without proof and refer the reader to [7] .
Lemma 5.4:
is the unique solution in of the functional equation (1) with boundary conditions (2) In general, the solution of (5.1) Thus we conclude that the probability with which the mixed strategies used by Players 1 and 2 converge to is equal to 1 as . Remark 5.7: a) Notice that the key condition in proving the above result is
A sufficient condition for (5.8) to hold is that (1, 1) is either a row-weak or column-weak saddle point. b) The original result in [6] is proved for a single game matrix instead of a convex combination of two game matrices, and the entries of the matrices and do not depend on a parameter. The key condition is still , which can be guaranteed by a row-weak or column-weak saddle point at (1, 1). However, in [6] it is assumed that (1, 1) is a strong saddle point. c) It can be seen that if and have coincident saddle points at , then with probability one. In order to study the behavior of , we introduce an induced game between the two agents-also known as Players 3 and 4. We view as the mixed strategies used by these two players. Recall our model assumes that Players 3 and 4 receive the same reward or penalty as Players 1 and 2, respectively. Thus the game between Players 3 and 4 is also zero-sum. We first consider the case in which game matrix and have coincident saddle points. Let be the game matrix of Player 3. That is, is the probability for Player 3 to receive +1 unit gain on the th play if Player 3 chooses action and Player 4 chooses action . Notice that this probability is time dependent. Since game A is played only when both Players 3 and 4 choose game A, it can be seen that and . Assume and have coincident saddle point at (1, 1 for all and , then would be a superregular function. In order to show this, we define . From the convexity of it can be shown that (11) and (12) In view of (5.11) and (5.12) the inequality (5.10) is true if From the definition of , we see that given any , there exists a constant such that for all
We conclude that converges to the action pair ((0, 1), (1, 0) we can show that , . Remark 5.11: The above result implies that asymptotically game B is always played with probability one.
VI. NONCOINCIDENT SADDLE POINTS
In the more general case where game matrices and have noncoincident saddle points, convergence results similar to that in Section V can also be obtained. , a contradiction to the assumption that . Hence we conclude that cannot occur with nonzero probability. The proof is complete.
Remark 6.2:
Again, we have shown that asymtotically game B will be played.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulations illustrate the analysis results, in particular, the prediction of noncooperation by Theorem 5.8 (coincident saddle points) and by Theorem 6.1 (noncoincident saddle points). The -scheme does not have the ergodic property and the results are dependent upon the initial states. Since the theory does not make claims with probability one, some simulation results actually show cooperation due to absorbing states and numerical simulation. Individual simulation runs are shown since averages are misleading due to absorbing states. Finally, some games are considered which do not have saddle points.
In all simulations, the reward parameter . An additional step length parameter [5] is used as a Euler step to smooth out the simulation results; effectively, this makes . Consider two game matrices with coincident saddle points at (1, 1):
and Fig. 1 shows and , the probabilities of selecting game A by Players 3 and 4, respectively. The figure also shows and , the probabilities of a reward for Player 3 selecting A or B, respectively. It can be seen that and as expected from Theorem 5.8. In the case , the theorem states that and , which is shown in a). The fact that game A, which requires cooperation, is less favorable to Player 3 than game B leads Player 3 to force the noncooperative result. However, in b), a particular run leads both players to favor cooperation and game A. The initial value allows a few runs to actually demonstrate accidental cooperation. This particular cooperative example disappears if we make the step length parameter even smaller, say . Note that the use of learning automata in real systems, say networks, implies that constants such as can have an effect on cooperation or noncooperation. Now consider noncoincident saddle points between game matrix above and which has a saddle point at (2, 1). Fig. 2(a) shows the results and, again, and and the probabilities act accordingly. However, there are some plays of the game around where almost equals and, in Fig. 2(b) , one particular run actually achieves an apparent equilibrium in with both players deciding to cooperate.
To examine this result in more detail, Fig. 3 shows the strategies , which goes to one, and , which goes to zero for the run in Fig. 2(a) and to one for the run in Fig. 2(b) . Note that the absorbing state (1, 1) has the same payoff in game A and in game B, specifically 0.6. This means that Player 3 does not have a preference between game A and game B so . Theorem 6.1 is still intact because it precludes the game structure for saddle point ( ); however, these game structures may be encountered in real systems and cooperation could result. Now consider game matrix above, with a saddle point, and the following game matrix which does not have a saddle ). Note that games A and B are identical except for one value at (1, 2) which favors Player 4 in game B and, therefore, goes to zero to force this game. The oscillations are in this nonsaddle point game and have been observed in earlier work [5] . This is an example of players which can decide which game to play but cannot decide which strategy to favor within the context of the game. In the particular run above, the initialization favors cooperation only of the time. However, an initialization that more strongly favors cooperation will not exhibit oscillations as the agents reach equilibrium in the pure strategies of game A.
Consider two game matrices with noncoincident saddle points and Various simulation runs show all four possible results of and going to zero or one. Fig. 5 shows one particular run with oscillations in and note that (350 000) almost reaches the absorbing state at zero, which other runs, not shown, actually do reach. In this particular run, both and go to one, hence cooperation. Note the interplay between and and . The oscillations in mean that sometimes game A is more favorable to Player 3 and sometimes game B, thus oscillates. The question arises as to the source of the oscillations in . Since is computed based on an expectation using and , there is an interplay between the decisions about which game to play, and , and which strategy to play within the game, and . In this particular run, oscillates between which game to play as , not shown, oscillates between which strategy to play. This illustrates the problem of multilevel decision making. Now consider two game matrices, neither of which has a saddle point: One particular run, see Fig. 6 , results in a cooperative absorbing state and so did two other runs out of a total of 100 runs. The oscillations are more severe than in the previous case of noncoincident saddle points.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we considered multilevel games and concentrated on the specific environment of zero-sum games with saddle points, decision making using the linear reward-inaction algorithm, and instantaneous exchange of information. The analysis has shown that noncooperation is typically the result in this specific environment. The reason for this is that, in zerosum games, one of the agents will find that game B is more to its advantage than game A, and any agent can unilaterally force game B to be played.
The simulation results showed this typical noncooperative behavior as well as some rare cooperative behavior due to absorbing states and numerical simulation. However, more general environments can exhibit a variety of behaviors. Our companion study [2] considers nonzero-sum games, decision making using the linear reward-penalty algorithm, and delayed information exchange. The results show that, with very small penalties, chaotic behavior is possible.
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